What We Must Learn From Boston

The New York Times reported these events in the aftermath of Boston. They occurred many months before the day of the bombings.

• Mar., 2011 (25 mos. Pre-Marathon – Russian authorities requested F.B.I. Tamerlan Tsarnaev (a/k/a terrorist #1) is being investigated by the F.B.I. Russian authorities have long suspected that he was involved in terrorist activities. F.B.I. According to the F.B.I., it did a thorough investigation of Tamerlan and found nothing unusual. Later, the Russians requested information from the C.I.A. to give the F.B.I. Tamerlan in its investigation.
• Oct., 2011 (18 mos. Pre-Marathon (C.I.A. Tamerlan was added to 2 federal “watchlist” databases. These databases alert authorities when a person of interest suspected in terrorist activity attempts to travel to an international destination.
• Jan., 2012 (15 mos. Jan. 2012 (15 mos.) – Tamerlan’s departure from Russia triggered a “ping” alert in a federal database. It was sent to an American Customs official who is part of the Boston Joint Terrorism Task Force. This alert was not shared with the Boston Police, F.B.I. or C.I.A. or Homeland Security.
• Jul., 2012 (9 mos. Jul., 2012 (9 mos. His return did NOT trigger another “ping” alert to the Boston Joint Terrorism Task Force and the Boston police F.B.I.A. or Homeland Security, because Tamerlan had “expired”, according to Janet Napolitano Director of Homeland Security.

This Times story shows that multiple government intelligence security agencies made serious errors months before the Boston attacks. This could be a coincidence, or the tip off a broader problem of government mismanagement of security resources used to combat domestic terrorism. It is easy to see that there will be more government mistakes after the Boston terrorists’ lengthy stay in the U.S. and the freedom they enjoyed at the expense and pleasure of taxpayers. Many of us feel uneasy and vulnerable to radicalized jihadists who dream of killing Americans because there is always more to come. We can’t afford to ignore the repeated government failures that make it easy for Islamic extremists. Boston is a good example of what we can learn from. First, people must stop trusting the government to protect them against terrorist attacks. We must also actively look to improve the management of our national security services.

Because the government failed to take advantage of multiple opportunities to stop Boston jihadists killing, it is now our responsibility to protect ourselves against the incompetence government bureaucrats. As individuals, we need to be more aware of what is going on around us, whether it’s at work, home, or play. We must also make sure that government does not repeat the mistakes made in Boston and elsewhere. The Times revelations show that government security officials failed in their duty to prevent what should have been prevented. What is the reason for this? This happened because our security forces were not properly managed, resulting in missed opportunities to stop terrorists from executing their hateful plan. We must correct these irreparable government errors and reform the government’s intelligence security services management. This must be done within the bureaus that are directly responsible for protecting citizens from Islamic fundamentalist terror.

How did this bad management situation occur?

We must first understand the history of how government intelligence security management has gotten so bad if we are to improve it. Consider how little the government has changed in the area of managerial selection since the Industrial Revolution. Since the beginning of the republic more than 200 years ago the dominant approach to selecting and identifying managers for government service was to rely on subjective and arbitrary qualifications criteria. As American society changed, public sector recruitment methods remained the same. We ignored science as a valuable tool to select our managers. This was despite science’s ability to provide most of the technological-driven comforts that we enjoy. Why? Why? Over the years, candidates with strong innate managerial skills were often overlooked for candidates with less leadership ability but better political connections. This sounds to you wise?

These selection and managerial shortcomings in government have thrived throughout the years, despite the obvious bias towards the well-connected as well as the continuing high costs of society. “What high cost?” You may ask. You ask. As their most valuable skill, managing, is not fully utilized throughout their careers, this leads to frustration. The second reason is that the competent but unqualified managers can become frustrated and even depressed. They are constantly trying to be what they cannot be, effective managers. This is because a manager who lacks the ability to manage well can struggle and his team will suffer. This results in a declining or stagnant organization that is progressively losing effectiveness. Due to increased operational shortcomings, taxpayers are also subject to a higher than necessary budgetary expense. The most important aspect of ineffective government is the human cost. This was evident in Boston, where many agencies failed to fulfill their mission to protect civilians.

What’s the next step? Human engineering science is the solution to this problem. This science, a branch in industrial psychology, focuses on the scientific measurement and assessment of people’s aptitudes for any type of work. What are aptitudes? What are aptitudes? These are the natural abilities and talents that people have to learn or do certain tasks quickly. According to human engineering scientists, managers and supervisors who lack strong managerial skills will fail. [1]

This brings us back again to Boston. Why wasn’t the Boston terrorists stopped by government security personnel before they did? It’s quite simple. A MINO is a person who is promoted or hired to manage (or supervise in government) but has poor managerial abilities is called Manager Name Only. While a MINO is a manager, they lack the natural talents (i.e. aptitudes) required to be able to lead effectively. How can we prove that MINOs were responsible for Boston’s security? There are many clues to the tragic outcome, beyond the news story that describes multiple security breaches. Government employees who are under the control of MINOs become discontented and unaccountable. They also become prone to making mistakes. Is “prone to errors” something you recognize?

Next question: How did poor government security management become so widespread that it led to the failures in Boston? The Backfill Selection Multiplier, a management behavior that I refer to as the Backfill Selective Multiplier, provides the answer. [2] Explaination: All managers, even those in government have the power to fill managerial or supervisory vacancies left by employees who leave. Because of the high turnover rate in MINO-managed companies, MINOs are constantly filling managerial positions. They tend to fill the managerial positions with their own managers, falsely claiming that they are good role models for management. These new-hire MINOs can only exacerbate the problems of the organization by replicating the ineffective leadership behavior of their bosses in lower levels within the agency. In this way, replacement MINOs who are just as inept at managing as their superiors create a negative ripple effect on the people who report to them. Poor managerial decisions spread from the top MINO up through the chain of command. This results in ever-increasing employee turnover and a decrease in morale. This accelerates the organization’s descent into ineffectiveness. This is the same management that was displayed by government intelligence security officers when they failed in preventing the Boston attacks. It’s clear to me.

The HUGM ( Highly unusual Great Manager) is 180 degrees to the MINO. What makes a manager great? HUGM has the perfect mix of strong managerial abilities. These qualities are known as the Sublime Nine Management Aptitudes. They include the following: interpersonal, intrapersonal and mathematical skills. [2] These managerial talents are innate, meaning that you either have them or not. These abilities can also be scientifically tested via human engineering science. HugMs that are government-employed are rare. Why? Because government doesn’t have the incentive to find, hire and deploy HUGMs in its bureaucracy. Let’s face it. Effective management in government results in greater job security for all employees. Do you recall a time when a government agency reduced its staff because of poor performance or incompetence. It has never happened to me, not after a “Boston”, or a”Benghazi!”

Imagine what government could accomplish with managers who have the Sublime Nine managerial abilities. It is impossible to underestimate the positive impact on public safety that this will have over the long-term. Let’s get the conversation started by presenting a partial list if the government hires HUGMs to support its intelligence security services.

• Improved efficiency of agency and employee performance.
• Reducing agency fraud, waste and abuse of taxpayer funds.
• Better designed integrated terrorist information systems.
• Improve agency decision-making and problem solving at all levels.
• U.S. and international intelligence sharing has been improved Information sharing between interagency terrorist organizations.
• New technologies for bomb detection, sniffing and defusing.
• Additional “best practices” procedures to investigate and stop terrorists.
• Enhanced systems to alert authorities and monitor terrorist travel.
• Less loss of life, injuries and property damage due to terrorism.
• Security oversight officers receive more timely and comprehensive anti-terrorism reports

These benefits are what give me confidence in HUGMs working for government. HugMs have the natural ability to manage effectively, as we’ve already stated. HugMs have the rare ability to recognize the strengths of their employees and assign them the jobs that are best suited to their abilities. This optimizes team member talent leads to high-performance work units. These teams also work together to achieve their agency’s mission. HugMs’ able leadership can ensure that extraordinary performance is possible with government security teams of such high calibre.

How can we fix the problem of poor management within the government’s intelligence security complex? The right solution is scientific aptitude testing, which specifically identifies and promotes HUGMs within the intelligence security bureaucracy. Aptitude testing is the best way to identify and select the most qualified managers for the agencies that we rely on to protect us against terrorist attacks.

To achieve fundamental change, you must take a bold first step.

I hope that the unimaginable and tragic losses in Boston will spur public pressure to change government security management. What would that “change” look? Tell your legislators to not waste their time enacting laws that only mask the problems of perpetual government failure. You must insist that they adopt a new approach to human resources (HR), which will fundamentally improve the management of our government security agencies. You should insist that they transform the management of large federal agencies responsible for investigating visa violations or anti-terrorism intelligence. This “pilot” agency’s HR department would implement the managerial recruiting ideas in this article. They would also replace any agency managers or supervisors who are leaving due to natural attrition. The HR team could use scientific aptitude testing to determine the ability of managerial candidates to replace any MINO who has left the agency with the corresponding HUGM. The agency will see huge improvements in its productivity and effectiveness as HUGMs are deployed more frequently. After the initial pilot is a success, HUGM floodgates open. The entire intelligence security community will demand managerial excellence. Our government will be able to dramatically improve its ability to protect Americans against future al-Qaeda-inspired, trained and supported terrorist attacks by fundamentally changing the way agency supervisors and managers are selected.